An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics
The Real Holy Grail: An Orthodox Response to Dan Brown's Deceptions in Angels and Demons and The Da Vinci Code
|
"Claiming to be wise, they became
fools" (Romans 1:22)
March
is the month which each year arouses Greek people all over the world to
celebrate the rebirth of modern Greece through independence, in conjunction
with the Annunciation, the " commencement of our salvation".
However, this month, which presents us twice with the issue of
freedom, can for this reason be a 'trap' as well. And a trap is anything
that can restrain our movement.
However, the topic of "freedom" — if examined
with the sensitivity and wholeness dictated by its very nature —
is connected automatically, and not only dialectically, to the topic of "slavery". That is why we are obliged to study it here,
although briefly, within the parameters which have already been mentioned,
or at least alluded to.
The basic main point that must be said right at the outset is that
the topic of "freedom" can only be seen in two ways: on the
one hand morally and philosophically (with or without foundation
in, or reference to, religion) and, on the other, sociopolitically
(with the appeal to external conditions and factors). This dual possibility
of approaching the topic is equally valid whether we are speaking about
the freedom of the individual or a social group of any size.
a) The moral and philosophical foundation of freedom unfortunately
remains an open, uncertain and ultimately unclear "fabricated
argument", regardless of how developed the conscience of the
on-looker may be in terms of cognition, aesthetics or morals. And
because this has to do with the judgement of the 'autonomous' person,
it is only natural that we have as many views on freedom as there are
philosophical or ethical systems. Such systems, as known, often conflict
or refute one another, rather than being mutually complementary. Precisely
on this point, then, we touch upon the most vital nerve of the problem:
can someone who is permanently exposed to the tyranny of their own constantly
changing will, or the will of someone else, speak about 'freedom'?
Given that personal conscience always remains confined to its limited
horizon due to historical as well as unmeasurable psychological
factors defining personal experience, it must be considered impossible
to reach individually the boundaries and sheer perspective of the
problem. That could only be achieved, and then evaluated accordingly,
by a 'super-individual' or 'universal' conscience. However, this kind
of conscience does not exist in human history. Nor can we take seriously
the fantasies of romantic idealism regarding 'absolute spirit'. Our world,
and all that is in it, is relative — not only in the sense of what
has passed, but also in terms of continual correlations — and not absolute. Thus the concept of 'freedom' is from the outset to be
seen in the context of relativity, namely historicity. Otherwise,
it would not be a conducive and reliable moral and cultural value —
for which humanity has justly fought with enormous sacrifices — but
rather a 'figment of the imagination' and a 'utopia'. We therefore naturally
reach the point of saying that, if freedom is the quintessence of human honour and dignity, it is not possible for any worldly authority
(whether individual or collective) to define its respective individual
presuppositions. Only God can have the final word on this. Since God alone
knows, wills and is able (being Omniscient, All good and Omnipotent)
to ensure the authentic specifications of freedom for the human person
made in His 'image' and likeness. When put in those terms, it is only
natural that the 'autonomous' moral and philosophical enquiry becomes
theological, without freedom of thought being necessarily bound by relentless
dogmatism.
We could say in summary that if one grounds personal freedom upon
'self-centred' rather than 'God-centred' reflection, then he or she remains bound by an individual and outmoded conscience. And since no single
conscience can contain all possible versions and aspects of the truth
about freedom, it is inevitable that the person who is bound by
such narrowness would think and seem like a 'slave' rather than a free
person.
From all the above, it can be seen that 'freedom' is, strictly
speaking, an issue of metaphysical rather than natural order. It
is a feat of perpetual self-transcendence and not an accomplishment as
such, not even for a split second. Consequently, instead of speaking about
a 'free' person, it would be more accurate to describe the person who
continuously struggles for freedom as being 'made free'. And one is 'made
free', according to the degree to which he or she is released from the
confinement of individual conscience that is developed -through the 'communion'
called for by interpersonal relations - 'to the measure of the stature
of the fullness of Christ' (Eph. 4:13). Yet, even then, man is not in
essence 'free', according to the dictates of self-love belonging to the
fallen human nature. Such a person is only 'made free' from the various
bonds of sin, thereby 'binding' or making him or her a 'slave' of the
one Lord of life and death, the God-Man Jesus Christ. Not withstanding
the above, man is a 'political animal' according to Aristotle's definition,
and for this reason there cannot be 'freedom' of the person which is not
reflective in some way of the general conditions of life in society (which
are mainly economic, ecological, cultural and political).
b) The social and political view of the topic of freedom perhaps
gives priority to external conditions of social harmony and justice, rather
than to moral principles that determine the honour and peaceful living
of the person as such. In spite of the fact that it relates, as we have
mentioned, to the freedom both of the individual and of society as a whole.
It could equally be said that it would be a rather ironic utopia
for one to believe that any degree of inner freedom is attainable if the
outer conditions did not have at least a minimum balance in the economic
and political factors that were just mentioned. This at any rate is illustrated
by Diogene's search for a 'human being' with a lamp in the middle of the
day. Otherwise, that leading cynic philosopher would have remained inactive,
satisfied in his personal 'bliss'.
This correlation and exchange between the two spheres in which
human 'responsibility' is exercised — as the other side of the coin
of 'freedom' — is the touchstone by which the relativity, on the
one hand, and the authenticity, on the other, of freedom will always be
measured. In conclusion, this means that no individual — not even
the most isolated hermit — and no people or country, no matter how
powerful they may appear to be in sociopolitical circumstances, can ever
boast about absolute 'independence' or absolute 'freedom'. This is because
it would not only be sacrilegious and a direct offence to God who 'spread
out the earth on the waters' (Psalm 135:6), but also because the notion
of absolute independence and freedom would be a rejection of the apparently
God-given mutual dependence and 'solidarity' between all created beings.
We are therefore justified in speaking about 'independence' and 'liberation'
from any kind of harmful 'bonds' of vicious habit or tyrannical domination
— but not from the organic bonds of global ecological balance and,
most of all, from the greatest universal hope of the eschatological unity
in Christ.
from Voice of Orthodoxy, vol 22/3, March 2000
the official publication of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese
of Australia
|
